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We describe a new error reconciliation protocol Winnow based on the exchange of parity and Ham-
ming’s “syndrome” for N−bit subunits of a large data set. Winnow was developed in the context
of quantum key distribution and offers significant advantages and net higher efficiency compared to
other widely used protocols within the quantum cryptography community. A detailed mathematical
analysis of Winnow is presented in the context of practical implementations of quantum key dis-
tribution; in particular, the information overhead required for secure implementation is one of the
most important criteria in the evaluation of a particular error reconciliation protocol. The increase
in efficiency for Winnow is due largely to the reduction in authenticated public communication
required for its implementation.
PACS Numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography [1] presents special problems
in regard to error correction of noisy quantum commu-
nications. Under the constraint that the public channel
can be authenticated, and the assumption that all public
communications can be eavesdropped, classical informa-
tion on the exchanged qubits must be revealed through
a series of public discussions to test the quantum key in-
tegrity and to remove the errors. Discrepancies within
the qubits, observed as errors, must be treated as having
been introduced by a hostile eavesdropper; the eaves-
dropper is generally referred to as Eve and labeled E in
this work.
In a classical environment all errors can always be re-
moved with the condition that to remove all errors one
may have to reveal all information. However, within the
secrecy framework imposed by quantum key distribution
(QKD), revealed information reduces privacy and the ef-
fective channel capacity. Because of this great care must
be taken to reveal a minimal amount of information to
remove errors from quantum key while accounting for the
leaked information to ensure key integrity after errors are
removed.
Within this context of QKD, the two parties that ex-
change qubits over a quantum channel (Alice (A) and
Bob (B) is the notation typically used within the quan-
tum cryptography community) must have a fast and ef-
ficient method to mend the quantum key; in addition,
they must also reduce E’s knowledge gained during pub-
lic discussions to a vanishingly small amount. These
constraints require that any error reconciliation protocol
will also need supporting protocols to provide a complete
framework for quantum cryptographic security. That
is, a useable QKD system will comprise a quantum-key
transmitter (A) and receiver (B), and a series of proto-
cols to remove errors and account for and mitigate the
information leakage attributable to E. The series of pro-
tocols includes [2,3], but is not necessarily limited to the
following: error-reconciliation [4,5], privacy amplification
[6] and signature authentication [7].
In addition to these protocols, we acknowledge a pro-
tocol generally formulated in [4] that we refer to as pri-
vacy maintenance. We also note that the predecessor
to CASCADE [5] — the best known and probably the
most widely used error reconciliation protocol — is also
generally formulated in [4] and is characterized by a bi-
nary search; here we refer to the binary search, which
is a major element of CASCADE, as BINARY. A fun-
damental difference between BINARY and CASCADE is
that CASCADE neglects privacy maintenance: all data
are retained until the necessary privacy amplification is
performed on the error-free data. We observe that the
reconciliation process is more efficient if privacy main-
tenance is implemented during reconciliation as will be-
come obvious in the following discussion.
Finally, this work introduces a new error reconciliation
protocol that uses a Hamming code [8,9] to remove errors.
We refer to this protocol as Winnow. Winnow is charac-
terized by the application of a parity test, a conditional
Hamming hash, and privacy maintenance.
II. HAMMING ERROR DETECTION AND
CORRECTION
The application of the Hamming hash function for er-
ror correction [8,9] is illustrated as follows:
First, after A and B exchange qubits on the quantum
channel, A and B then divide their random bits into
blocks of length Nh = 2
m − 1. (Due to the 1:1 correla-
tion of these data, we henceforth refer to these blocks as
a single data- or bit-block.) The m−bit (m ≥ 3) syn-
dromes Sa and Sb are then calculated, where Sa and Sb
respectively depend only on A’s or B’s bits in a particu-
lar block.
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Next, B transmits his syndrome to A and errors are
only discovered if the syndrome difference Sd (exclusive
or of Sa with Sb) is non-zero:
Sd = Sa ⊕ Sb 6= {0}m. (1)
Finally, m bits are deleted from each bit block to elim-
inate the potential loss of privacy to E due to the (classi-
cal) communication of B’s syndromes: m bits of informa-
tion are revealed on each block for which Sb is revealed
reducing the channel capacity per symbol by m/Nh [10].
Specifically, data privacy is maintained by removal
of m bits from each block at the {2j} positions where
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. These bits are independent in the
syndrome calculations as seen below in the matrix h(m):
h(3) =

 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1

 , (2)
where for this particular matrix, m ≡ 3. We refer to the
operation of discarding bits in this manner [4] as privacy
maintenance.
As a final comment on Eq. 2, note that the transpose of
h(3) ≡ [h(3)]T are the binary equivalent numbers 1 to 7,
and is generalized such that [h(m))]T ≡ {1, . . . , (2m−1)},
Nh binary numbers.
The matrix h(m) is a special form of hash function [11]
and is represented by:
h
(m)
i,j =
⌊
j
2i−1
⌋
(mod 2) , (3)
where i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and j ∈ {1, . . . , Nh}; arithmetic is
modulo 2.
The Hamming algorithm always corrects any single er-
ror within any Nh-bit block, but the effect of the Ham-
ming algorithm, which is related to the syndromes and
privacy maintenance, is less clear in the event that more
than one error exists in a bit block. Such considerations
are now discussed in detail in terms of the syndromes.
The syndromes Sa and Sb are formed by contraction
of the Nh−bit blocks with the matrix h(m):
Si =

Nh∑
j=1
Xjh
(m)
i,j

 (mod 2) ∈ {0, 1}m, (4)
where subscript i represents syndrome bit i in the m-bit
binary syndrome, Xj represents bit j ∈ A’s or B’s block,
and S = {Si} is the binary syndrome value of either B’s
or A’s block. Understanding the effect of the syndromes
in locating and correcting errors is crucial to assessing
the performance of Hamming, and thus Winnow.
The syndrome difference (Eq. 1) defines a binary num-
ber that gives the location of a single bit in A’s or B’s
code word that when toggled from 0 7→ 1 or from 1 7→ 0
affects the syndrome difference Sd such that when the
syndrome difference is recalculated it gives the binary
number S′d ≡ {0}m. For example, if Sd 6= {0}m, then Sd
is an m-bit binary number whose value gives the location
of a single bit in either A’s or B’s code-word to add ex-
clusive or with the orignal bit value. After that bit value
is changed, then the new syndrome for that code word is
then calculated (e.g. S′A) and added (again, exclusive or)
to the original syndrome for the other code word (SB in
this example). The result is that the changing of the sin-
gle bit indicated by the non-zero syndrome difference in
the one code-word either corrects an error, or introduces
another, in that code word. This is no great mystery
but rather reflects the fact that Hamming codes are n-k
codes. In this case, n = 2m−1 relates the number of bits
in each code word (Nh), and k = n−m relates the chan-
nel capacity (the channel capacity is k/n ⇐⇒ k/Nh per
bit) given the code (a Hamming code in this discussion).
In an n-k Hamming code, there are 2(2
m) unique code
words characterized by 2m unique syndromes; further,
there are 2k code words with the same syndrome. Be-
cause this code can correct 1 error, it has a minimum
Hamming distance of d = 3. This also means it can de-
tect at least 2 errors. In fact the Hamming distance d for
the Hamming code is d ≡ 3.
By definition, a code word with a single error will have
Sd 6= {0}m (can obviously detect a single error if it can
correct a single error). In addition, if a code word has ex-
actly 2 errors then by definition Sd 6= {0}m (can detect at
least 2 errors if it can correct a single error). Therefore,
if a code word has exactly 2 errors, then after applying
the Hamming algorithm, and after changing the bit value
indicated by Sd, the code word will finish with exactly
3 errors. The proof is by contradiction: If a code word
with 2 errors finished with 1 error (an error was cor-
rected), then the new syndrome difference would be non-
zero! Contradiction also proves that 1-error is corrected
if there is exactly 1 error: If an error was introduced the
syndrome difference would again be non-zero. Thus, in
examining Hamming codes we observe that a code word
with 1 error will finish with 0 errors, but a code word
with exactly 2 errors finishes with exactly 3 errors. In
each case the new syndrome difference changes such that
S′d = {0}m.
By symmetry, if an Nh-bit code word contains exactly
Nh − 1-errors (all the bits except one are in error), then
after application of Hamming all the bits in the code
word will be in error. Further, a code word that contains
Nh− 2 errors will finish with Nh− 3 errors, i.e one of the
errors is corrected.
The above arguments imply that a Hamming code only
works well if the probability of 2 or more errors is low
relative to the liklihood of a single, or no, errors. In
either case the Hamming code is inefficient as m-bits are
revealed in the syndrome (this fact is discussed in detail
later).
The difficult question to answer in analyzing the per-
formance of a Hamming code is how does Hamming affect
code words with more than 2, but less than 2m−1, errors?
It is not obvious but the number of code words with
3-errors and Sd ≡ {0}m is related to the number of ways
2-error code words map to a code word with 3 errors
(and Sd = {0}m). In other words, there must be a way
to arrange 3 errors in a code word and still maintain
Sd = {0}m. Lacking this would mean that the code could
always detect more than 2 errors with a Hamming dis-
tance of d = 3.
To complete the Hamming efficiency analysis, how
code words with 3 or more errors are affected after ap-
plication of Hamming must be analyzed. For 3 errors it
is now obvious: there must be at least 2m − 1 ways to
start with 3 errors in an Nh-bit code word and still finish
with 3 errors. In the case that there exist 3 errors in a
code word, and Sd 6= {0}m, then an error will be intro-
duced into the Nh-bit code word because if the code word
finished with 2 errors then Sd 6= {0}m—a contradiction.
As a special case (example), considerm = 3. There are(
7
3
)
= 35 ways to arrange 3 errors in 7 bits. Because there
are exactly 7 non-zero syndrome differences for m = 3
and ni = 2, there must be at least 7 ways to arrange
3 errors in 7-bits and have Sd ≡ {0}m. In fact for this
special case this is the result. What this means is that,
statistically, 7 in 35 code words with 3-errors will finish
with 3-errors, and 28 in 35 words with 3 errors will finish
with 4 errors. Thus, code words that start with 3 errors
will finish with 19/5 errors per 7-bit block, in the limit of
an infinite number of 7-bit blocks with exactly 3 errors.
By symmetry, it is obvious that given an infinite number
of 7-bit blocks with exactly 4 errors, the final error rate
per block would be 16/5—a lower final error rate.
Thus, what is needed is a way to calculate, for any
number m of parity checks, in Hamming, a way to cal-
culate the number of ways to arrange the initial number
of errors per block and finish with Sd = {0}m, or with
Sd 6= {0}m. Eq. 6 permits that calculation for any ini-
tial number of errors per block, ni, given any initial block
size, Nh:
NSd 6=0 +NSd=0 =
(
Nh
ni
)
−NSd 6=0 +Nh ·NSd=0 = (−1)q ·Nh ·
(
Nh−1
2
p
)
(5)
⇐⇒
[
NSd 6=0
NSd=0
]
=
[
Nh 1
−1 1
]−1 [ (Nh
ni
)
(−1)q(Nh−12
p
)
]
,
where q = ⌈ni/2⌉, p = ⌊ni/2⌋, ni is the initial number of
errors per Hamming block of Nh = 2
m−1 bits per block;
in this situation, NSd=0 gives the number of syndrome
differences with Sd = {0}m, and NSd 6=0 gives the number
of syndrome differences with Sd 6= {0}m. Eq. 6 is gener-
alized by dividing both sides by the total number of ways
to arrange ni errors in the Nh bits. In this situation we
find a more useful quantity:
ΠSd=0 =
NSd=0(
Nh
ni
) , and (6)
ΠSd 6=0 =
NSd 6=0(
Nh
ni
) .
This result is required later.
These arguments are not obviously general for the case
of m > 3, but they give insight into the general problem.
The difficulty with the special case of m = 3 and ni = 3
is that the next case of ni = 4 is symmetric and comple-
mentary with ni = 3, as mentioned previously. Further,
as was noted, there is no path to map 3 errors to 2 errors
as Sd 6= {0}m when there are exactly 2 errors. However,
Eq. 6 is the general technique to calculate the quantities
specified, i.e. the number of ways to map ni errors to
Sd = {0}m or not, given Nh = 2m − 1 bits in a block.
Given these facts, how the errors change form ≥ 4 and
4 ≤ ni < 2(m−1) is the general result of interest.
Let n
(+)
i be the number of ways to increase the number
of errors from ni to ni + 1, in a bit-block, and n
(−)
i the
number of ways to decrease the number of errors from ni
to ni − 1; of course, the considerations relate to m ≥ 4.
The results are as follows:
n
(+)
i = NSd=0(Nh|ni) + (ni + 1) ·NSd=0(Nh|ni + 1)
n
(−)
i =
(
Nh
ni
)
− n(+)i , (7)
where NSd=0(Nh|ni+1) is the number of ways to arrange
ni+1 errors in Nh bits and obtain Sd = {0}m (the reader
will recall that earlier it was stated that the number of
ways to get Sd = {0}m for ni + 1 errors is directly re-
lated to the number of ways to map ni 7→ ni + 1 errors);
of course, NSd=0(Nh|ni) is the number of ways to arrange
ni errors in Nh bits and get Sd = {0}m. Thus, the gener-
alized probability for the number of errors ni to increase,
or decrease is:
Π(+) =
n
(+)
i
n
(+)
i + n
(−)
i
, and
Π(−) = 1−Π(+). (8)
III. WINNOW
As a general rule, the ideal error correcting protocol
would correct all bit errors in each bit block, introduce
no additional bit errors, and reveal a minimal amount of
information on the key bits to an eavesdropper through
public communication. The outlined Hamming protocol
has a number of shortcomings regarding this ideal. First,
the difference syndrome Sd does not distinguish between
single- and multiple-bit errors. Therefore, additional er-
rors may be introduced if instances of Sd 6= {0}m are
treated as due to single errors. Second, up to m bits of
information are exchanged for each data block reducing
channel capacity per symbol with each exchange: infor-
mation which can be compromised by eavesdropping.
One solution is to eliminate all bits within data blocks
for which Sd 6= {0}m. This certainly removes the pos-
sibility of introducing additional bit errors into the key,
but, unfortunately, the efficiency of such a method is low
as every block loses eitherm-bits to privacy maintenance,
or all bits because Sd 6= {0}m. The efficiency of this ap-
proach is not optimal as most of the discarded bits/blocks
for which Sd 6= {0}m are probably not in error.
Another, more powerful solution is to introduce a pre-
liminary parity comparison on a block of N = 2m bits
and to make a comparison of the syndromes Sa and Sb
conditional upon the result of the parity comparison.∗
If the block parities do not agree an odd number of er-
rors exists in the N -bit block. Moreover, if the bit errors
are distributed randomly throughout the data, and if the
number of errors is sufficiently small, then an odd num-
ber of errors in a block probably indicates a single error
which can be corrected by the additional application of
the Hamming algorithm. For example, in the situation
that a block contains one bit error, if Sd = {0}m then
the first bit is in error. (By symmetry it is clear that
if there are exactly N − 1 errors in the block the first
bit would not be in error.) Thus, this approach always
allows the correction of a single error in the N bits, i.e.
if the bits are to be retained. However, in the protocol
outlined here the one bit is regularly discarded for pri-
vacy maintenance (for the exchanged parity bit) and the
Hamming algorithm is applied to the remaining Nh bits,
as previously discussed, and then ⌈log2(Nh)⌉ additional
bits are discarded to complete the privacy maintenance
giving a channel capacity of (2m −m − 1)/N per sym-
bol on blocks that contain an initial parity error. This
appears to be an additional loss of channel capacity, but
∗Hamming discusses the addition of a parity check on the
Nh = 2
m − 1 bit block [9] (pp. 47-48; pp. 213-214). His con-
clusion is thatA andB are more likely to introduce additional
errors than correct errors by changing a bit if Sd 6= {0}
m and
the block-parities agree. In this situation A and B could ei-
ther remove the m+ 1 bits required to ensure privacy on the
remaining bits (which may remove errors), or they could elim-
inate all of the bits in question, as ni ∈ {2, 4, . . . , 2
m−2} > 1.
The expanded protocol described in this effort allows the
detection of an even or odd number of errors and prevents
a correction attempt on those data blocks with even num-
bers of errors. This is important since the Hamming algo-
rithm will increase the number of errors in blocks which have
2 ≤ ni ≤ Nh/2.
because the syndromes are not exchanged and compared
when the block parities agree the channel capacity ac-
tually increases over the basic Hamming algorithm; one
bit is still discarded from the blocks that do not exhibit
a parity error for privacy maintenance. We refer to this
error reconciliation protocol as Winnow.
Winnow reveals log2(N)+ 1 bits in 2 classical commu-
nications when the parities on the N bits do not agree:
m bits for the syndrome and 1 bit for parity; conversely,
Winnow reveals 1 bit of information in 1 classical com-
munication when the parities agree.†
Therefore, the amount of key data discarded is
Nodddis. = log2(N) + 1 = m+ 1 (9)
bits for blocks with odd numbers of errors such that the
fraction of the bits remaining after privacy maintenance
is
µoddpm = 1−
Nodddis.
N
. (10)
For N ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64, 128},
µoddpm ∈ {0.5, 0.69, 0.88, 0.89, 0.94}, respectively. Also,
µevenpm = 1−
1
N
, (11)
and µevenpm ∈ {0.88, 0.94, 0.97, 0.98, 0.99} for the same val-
ues of N . In either case, the appropriate overhead for
the classical communications is also removed immedi-
ately from the data so that the privacy of the bits is
at least maintained if not improved.
All single bit errors in an N -block are guaranteed to
be either eliminated or corrected after a single pass of
Winnow (a Winnowing). What remains to be consid-
ered is how blocks with multiple errors affect the overall
efficiency of Winnow.
IV. WINNOW EFFICIENCY
Define the change in number of errors in a given block
and for a given initial number of errors as ∆n = nf −ni,
where ni and nf ≡ nf (ni|N) are the initial and final
numbers of bit errors in a block prior to and after Win-
nowing, respectively. The average change in the number
of errors, for a given number of initial errors, after aWin-
nowing (this step includes elimination of the parity bit
†Exchanging the parity on N = 2m bits instead of Nh =
2m−1 bits results in slightly higher channel capacity. That is:
more information is revealed when the syndrome information
is combined with the parity information on a Nh bit block
than is revealed when the parity and syndrome are revealed
on N bits in Winnow.
but not the final m-bits required for completion of the
privacy maintenance step) can be expressed as
∆¯n ≡ 〈∆n(ni)〉 = 1∑
∆n=−2
∆n·p(∆n|ni), (12)
where
1∑
∆n=−2
p(∆n|ni) = 1, (13)
and p(∆n|ni) is the probability that the number of errors
will change by ∆n ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1} given an initial condi-
tion of ni errors in an N−bit data block. The p(∆n|ni)
of interest can be written more instructively as
p(+1|ni)=pi(n)·ΠSd 6=0(ni)·Π(+)(ni)
p(±0|ni)=pi(n)·ΠSd=0(ni)+pi(y) ·ΠSd 6=0(δni)·Π(+)(δni)
p(−1|ni)=pi(n)·ΠSd 6=0(ni)·Π(−)(ni) + pi(y) ·ΠSd=0(δni)
p(−2|ni)=pi(y)·ΠSd 6=0(δni)·Π(−)(δni), (14)
where, ni is as previously defined, δni ≡ ni − 1, pi(y∨n)
depends only on the initial number of errors (ni) in
the N -bit block and is the probability the bit discarded
for privacy maintenance following the parity check was
(y), or (∨) was not (n) in error; ΠSd=0(n
∨
i δni) and
ΠSd 6=0(n
∨
i δni) are the probabilities that Sa = Sb or
Sa 6=Sb for ni or δni errors in Nh bits and are concretely
defined in Eq. 7, and Π(±)(n∨i δni) is defined in Eq. 8.
Eq. 12 can be expressed in terms of pi(y∨n), ΠSd and
Π(±) as
∆¯n ≡ 〈∆n(n)(ni)〉+ 〈∆n(y)(ni)〉,
= ∆¯n
(n)
+ ∆¯n
(y)
, (15)
where the arguments which depend on ni have been sup-
pressed, and
∆¯n
(n)
= pi(n)·ΠSd 6=0(ni)·
[
1−2·Π(−)(ni)
]
,
∆¯n
(y)
= pi(y) ·ΠSd 6=0(δni)·
[
1−2·Π(−)(δni)
]
− pi(y). (16)
The final quantity needed to calculate the efficiency of
Winnow is pi(y∨n):
pi(y) =
ni
N
, where
pi(y) + pi(n) = 1.
Table I and Table II provide a concrete example for the
special case of m = 3 of the effects of Winnow on blocks
with exactly ni ∈ {0, . . . , 8} errors. Table I, introduces a
new quantity
n¯f ≡ 〈nf 〉 = ni + ∆¯n, (17)
and in Table II a new parameter
pf =
n¯f
Nf
(18)
is defined.
The parameter pf defines the probability for each bit
in a given block to be in error. The number Nf ∈
{N − 1, N − m − 1} and its value depends on the ac-
tion required by Winnow for a given number of initial
errors. For example, Nf = N − 1 or N −m − 1 for pf
and ni even or odd, respectively.
These two tables illustrate the effect of Winnow on
data which are divided into 8-bit blocks. The values
marked with superscript p reflect the effect of discard-
ing one bit following the parity comparison. The values
marked with superscript ph refer to the data after the
Hamming algorithm is also applied, but before the req-
uisite log2(N) = 3 bits of data are discarded for privacy
maintenance. The final values denoted by subscript f
reveal the effect of Winnow (including the effect of all
discarded data required for privacy maintenance).
The parameter pf clearly shows a reduction in errors
for ni = 1 and an increase in errors for ni = 3. It also
shows that discarding data to maintain privacy of the
remaining key has no effect on the error probability.
The fraction of key remaining after a Winnowing is
given by
µN ≡ 〈Nf 〉
N
=
∑N
ni=0
Nf P (ni|N)
N
, (19)
and the probability for any key bit to be in error following
a Winnowing is
pN =
〈n¯f 〉
〈Nf 〉 =
∑N
ni=0
n¯f (ni)·P (ni|N)
N ·µN , (20)
where P (ni|N) is the probability for an N -bit block to
contain ni errors before a Winnowing.
Obviously, the efficiency with which Winnow removes
errors depends upon the distribution of errors within the
data. Without intimate knowledge of a specific QKD
apparatus, a reasonable assumption is that the errors are
random and normally distributed throughout the data.
Given this assumption, P (ni|N) in Eq. 20 is given by
the binomial distribution
P (ni | N, p0) =
(
N
ni
)
p0
ni(1− p0)N−ni (21)
where p0 is the probability that any given bit is in (rela-
tive) error.
With this assumption, Eqs. 19 and 20 can be expressed
as
µN =
N − 1−m∑nodd
i
(
N
ni
)
p0
ni(1 − p0)N−ni
N
, (22)
where m = log2(N), and
pN =
∑N
ni=0
n¯f (ni)
(
N
ni
)
p0
ni(1− p0)N−ni
N ·µN . (23)
The efficiency with whichWinnow reduces errors in the
key is of great interest. Two related issues which concern
the efficiency are: 1) the number of iterations of Winnow
necessary to achieve a sufficiently low probability of error
in the remaining key data, and 2) the amount of key data
that is discarded through privacy maintenance.
The number of iterations is of concern because each it-
eration reveals information and consumes time with each
communication between A and B. Moreover, each com-
munication requires the use of some private key for sig-
nature authentication [7]. Most importantly, though, is
that each iteration requires a significant amount of data
to be discarded through privacy maintenance.
Smaller N require more data to be discarded than
larger N as can be seen from Eq. 22. However, an ef-
fect which tends to mollify this undesirable condition is
that smaller N are more efficient at removing errors for
larger values of initial error probability. This effect is
illustrated in Fig. 1 where we have plotted pN/p0 for
several values of N . For all values of N and p0 suffi-
ciently small, pN/p0 < 1 and the protocol can remove
errors from the key data. However, as p0 increases from
p0 = 0, each of the curves passes through pN/p0 = 1 in-
dicating that additional errors are being introduced into
the key. Moreover, the value of p0 for which pN/p0 = 1
is smaller for larger N and the curves do not intersect
between p0 = 0 and pN/p0 = 1.
As a primary requirement of Winnowing real data in
an iterative application, a random shuffling of the data
between iterations is essential to randomly redistribute
missed or introduced errors. Without this random shuffle
multiple errors remain clumped together and, in essence,
are impossible to completely remove from the data. Un-
der this constraint it is obvious that the final error prob-
ability, and the amount of data remaining after a number
of Winnowings, depends on the way in which N is varied
throughout the successive Winnowings. An intuitive re-
sult which we have verified empirically is that less data
are discarded for the same initial and final error probabil-
ities if N is chosen well for the first iteration and is either
held constant or increased for all subsequent iterations;
there is no advantage to decreasing N in subsequent it-
erations if Winnow is applied as outlined here.
Define
p(p0; {jN}) (24)
and
µ(p0; {jN}) (25)
as the final error rate and fraction of data remaining
after a sequence {jN} = {j8, j16, j32, j64, j128} where
jN iterations of Winnow are applied with a block size
N ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64, 128} beginning with N = 8 and in-
creasing monotonically in N by factors of 2.‡
Because (p8 < p0) ∀ (p0 < 0.5), it may appear that
errors can be corrected in the data for this entire range
of initial error probability. However, there is another cri-
terion that must be met which significantly reduces the
maximum correctable error probability: There must re-
main a finite amount of error-free data after the potential
information possessed by E is reduced through privacy
amplification.
The maximum amount of potential information pos-
sessed by E can be determined by the initial error proba-
bility p0 and depends on the QKD protocol and the type
of attacks being employed. For example, if the BB84 pro-
tocol is used and E employs a complete intercept/resend
attack on the quantum channel in the same bases used
by B, she will introduce an error probability of p0 = 1/4.
She will also potentially know 1/2 of the data before error
reconciliation and up to 2/3 of the data which remains
after error reconciliation.
If E uses a more clever intercept/resend strategy of
detecting and resending in the Breidbart basis (second
paper in [4]), she would introduce the same number of
errors (p0 = 1/4) and could know up to a fraction of
0.59 of the data before error reconciliation and 0.78 of
the data remaining after error reconciliation.
It should also be noted that certain states of light are
more susceptible to attack than others. For example,
consider weak coherent states which are commonly used
in QKD systems. If E also employs a beamsplitter at-
tack [3,4,12] against one of these systems, an additional
amount of data is compromised which is not greater than
the mean number of photons in the state. However, this
value can be made arbitrarily small so it is neglected in
the following calculations. Moreover, other states of light
can be used in QKD schemes which are not vulnerable
to this type of attack [13].
Thus, the fraction of data remaining after error recon-
ciliation and privacy amplifications can be
νbb84 = µ− (0.59)4 p0 (26)
for BB84, where ν describes the remaining fraction of
key.
From the above considerations, p and ν can be inves-
tigated as a function of p0. Of particular interest is the
maximum p0 for which some secure data remains while
achieving a sufficiently low final error probability to make
‡In this work N is constrained such that N ≤ 128 only for
the sake of brevity. We have found that this constraint does
not impose a serious limit on the ability of Winnow to correct
errors. The ideas discussed below can be extended to include
N > 128 in a straightforward manner.
the data useful. We have chosen, somewhat arbitrarily,
p ≤ 10−6 as a reasonable target for the final error prob-
ability.
With this target and the remaining fraction of private
data described by Eq. 26, we find the largest initial error
probability for which some private data remains is
p0 = 0.1322, (27)
after Winnowing and privacy amplification.
To achieve p <∼ 10−6 from this large initial error
probability, Winnow must be applied in the sequence
{jN} = {3, 1, 0, 1, 3}. That is, 3 Winnowings with N = 8
must be followed by 1 Winnowing with N = 16, etc. If
this prescription is followed,
νbb84 = 0.0017 (28)
of the original data remain and are secure following pri-
vacy amplification.
Some QKD schemes require a larger estimate of E’s
knowledge. If Eq. 26 is replaced with [4]
ν = µ− 2
√
2 p0, (29)
we find
p0 = 0.1222 (30)
for {jN} = {3, 0, 1, 0, 4}. This leaves a fraction ν =
0.0017 of the original data as secure data with a single-bit
error probability ≤ 10−6.
Finally, if we estimate that E knows every bit of data
by causing p0 = 1/4, then
ν = µ− 4 p0. (31)
We then find that the largest reconcilable p0 is
p0 = 0.1037 (32)
for {jN} = {2, 1, 1, 0, 3} and ν = 0.0020.
The most efficient iteration sequence ({jN}) for any
QKD scheme can be determined by first applying Win-
now with N = 8 to estimate p0. Once the number of
blocks with odd and even (even includes zero) errors,
Modde and M
even
e respectively, are known, the fraction
# of Parity Errors
# of Blocks
=
∑
nodd
i
(
N
ni
)
p0
ni(1− p0)N−ni
N
(33)
can be used to estimate p0. Knowledge of p0 is sufficient
to determine the {jN} which maximizes ν.
For small p0, the most efficient {jN} may start with
N > 8. However, working systems that have been re-
ported in the literature [4,14] have large enough error
probabilities so that the most key is left if N = 8 for at
least the first iteration.
A detailed analysis of the advantages of Winnow over
other protocols is beyond the scope of this work. How-
ever, it is instructive to note the advantages over at least
the best-known protocol CASCADE.
The most notable difference between Winnow or BI-
NARY and CASCADE is that CASCADE does not em-
ploy privacy maintenance. The disadvantage of such a
protocol is that super-redundant information must be
exchanged with each successive iteration. This is to be
compared with BINARY and Winnow which reduce the
size of the data set with each communication. With the
reasonable requirement that a bit revealed through these
communications requires at least a bit to be eliminated
through some channel, either before or during privacy
amplification, then the inefficiency of keeping all bits un-
til all errors are removed becomes obvious: retaining and
repetitively exchanging information on the same bits is
an additional expense to the protocol.
For the purpose of comparison, we have computed
the maximum p0 which BINARY (less privacy mainte-
nance) can successfully reconcile errors and preserve a
small amount of secure data after privacy amplification
and the removal of the super-redundant information. We
find
p0 = 0.114 (34)
for {jN} = {2, 1, 0, 2, 1} and νbb84 = 0.01 when (0.59)4 p0
describes the additional amount of key that must be dis-
carded through privacy amplification. This is to be com-
pared with p0 = 0.1322 for the same considerations with
Winnow. This application of BINARY is a reasonable ap-
proximation to CASCADE which may include a higher
order correction giving a slightly higher overall error re-
duction than BINARY without privacy maintenance.
This comparison (or any of the previous discussion)
does not take into account bits used to authenticate mes-
sages sent between A and B. Both CASCADE and BI-
NARY requires significantly more two-way communica-
tion thanWinnow, and each packet of n bits sent may re-
quire ⌈log2(n)⌉ for authentication [7]. We calculate that
the most efficient application of CASCADE requires a
minimum of 1 + log2(N) communications per iteration
while Winnow requires only 2 communications for any
block size N that exhibits a parity error; the additional
communications required imposes a tight limitation on
practical efficiency. In addition, because CASCADE does
not maintain privacy, subsequent iterations requires more
bits to be exchanged in the initial parity phase with each
iteration. The additional bit exchanges may require ad-
ditional signature authentication bits.
We acknowledge that because CASCADE and BI-
NARY always removes a single error and never introduces
additional errors to multiple error blocks, both BINARY
and CASCADE perform infinitesimally better thanWin-
now in an environment where signature authentication is
not required and privacy maintenance is removed from
the Winnow and BINARY protocols. However, Win-
now’s 2 communications is a great advantage where time
is of the essence with regard to production of secure key
bits over inefficient noisy quantum channels.
V. CONCLUSION
We have identified a new, fast, efficient, error recon-
ciliation protocol for quantum key distribution which re-
quires only 2 communications between the two parties
attempting to reconcile private, quantum key material.
We refer to this protocol as Winnow.
Winnow incorporates a preliminary parity comparison
on blocks whose size is N = 2m where m ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, ...}.
Subsequently, one bit is discarded from these blocks to
maintain the privacy of the remaining bits. A Hamming
hash function, which can be used to correct single errors,
is applied to the remaining N−1 bits on the blocks whose
parities did not agree. Finally, m bits are discarded from
the blocks on which the Hamming algorithm was applied
to maintain the privacy of those bits.
We find this protocol capable of correcting an initial
error probability of up to 13.22% in privacy amplified
BB84-like quantum key distribution schemes.
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FIG. 1. The ratio pN/p0 for N = 8, 16 and 32. These
curves illustrate the change in the probability that a given
bit is in error after a single application of Winnow for the
indicated block size N . Note that (p8 < p16) ∀ (p0 < 0.38);
in addition, (p16 < p32) ∀ (p0 < 0.20). This indicates that
a pplications of Winnow with smaller N are more efficient at
removing errors than are applications with larger N within
the region where p0 satisfies these conditions.
TABLE I. n¯f for N = 8 for various stages in Winnow (note
that Hamming is not applied to blocks that contain an even
number of errors).
ni 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
n¯p
f
0 0.88 1.75 2.63 3.5 4.38 5.25 6.13 7
n¯phf 0 0 1.75 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.25 7 7
n¯f 0 0 1.75 2.0 3.5 2.0 5.25 4 7
TABLE II. n¯f/Nf for N = 8 for various stages in Winnow
(note that the Hamming component of Winnow is not applied
to blocks that contain an even number of errors).
pi 0 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.5 0.63 0.75 0.88 1
ppf 0 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.5 0.63 0.75 0.88 1
pphf 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 1 1
pf 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 1 1
